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Impeachment is an important check on executive authority in presidential 
democracies. It is the constitutional tool for removing power-hungry presi-
dents who threaten democracy, break the law, or get involved in corruption 
or other scandalous behaviour. Further, the mere existence of impeachment 
as a constitutional check on presidents may deter presidential misconduct. 
However, as recent examples in Latin America show, impeachment also 
opens the door for partisan interests and opportunistic political behaviour.
 • Impeachment is a real threat for presidents without a legislative basis of sup-
port, while those with majorities are shielded, despite likely wrongdoings. 
 • In Brazil, the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016 generated 
popular disillusionment with all political actors, paving the way for right-wing 
populist Jair Bolsonaro as president. In turn, despite a large and increasing 
number of impeachment requests on very serious grounds uncovered by con-
gressional investigations, President Bolsonaro has thus far averted an impeach-
ment process.
 • In Peru, political polarisation, fragmentation, and continued presidential in-
stability shows that impeaching a president may be an ineffective and even a 
counterproductive tool when the problem at hand is deeper and broader than 
the misconduct of the chief executive. 
 • Finally, whereas an impeachment may successfully remove a president, it does 
not provide a successor, often the vice-president, with a legitimate mandate 
or political backing to lead the country out of the crisis. It may actually reduce 
rather than enhance the legitimacy and governance capacity of the executive.
Policy Implications
External actors, such as the United States or the European Union, must be aware 
that impeachments are not an “easy fix.” On the contrary, they may not address 
personal misbehaviour; instead, deep structural problems may lie behind the se-
vere political crisis upon which impeachments mount. Therefore, external actors 
need to decode the underlying crisis, which could be one of representation, and 
address it by supporting constructive solutions that emphasise the accountability 
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Impeachment: A Solution, But Not for All Problems
Public disaffection with politics has recently reached new heights in Latin America. 
With the end of the commodity boom, economic hardship became the norm, trig-
gering a wave of discontent and protests in 2019. Corruption scandals fed the trend, 
particularly since the scandal involving the construction company Odebrecht burst 
in Brazil and spread across the region, with negative repercussions against political 
and business elites. On top of that, the COVID-19 pandemic deepened econom-
ic privations and nurtured increasing public discontent and anti-political moods 
through exposés of corruption in contracts, privileges in vaccination processes, col-
lapsed health systems, and a halted education for millions of youths and children. 
The goals and targets of popular discontent in the region are often diffuse, dis-
organised, and vary from country to country, but an underlying motivation is a 
general dissatisfaction with the political system, politicians, and their performance. 
However, in presidential systems such as those that prevail across the region, the 
chief executive and the party in government often end up on centre stage and their 
dismissal through impeachment is conceived as a concrete measure to bring a coun-
try out of crisis. In recent years we have seen impeachment attempts – both un-
successful, such as in Chile (December 2019), Paraguay (March 2021) and Peru 
(December 2017 and September 2020), and successful in Peru (November 2020), 
as well as two presidential resignations in Peru, the first connected to troublesome 
president-congress relations (March 2018), the second to popular protests (Novem-
ber 2020). 
However, impeachments do not fit as a solution to all problems, and even if 
they could theoretically fit to many, in practice they often do not operate as the 
constitution dictates. Impeachments are constitutional provisions that act as in-
between-election accountability mechanisms against presidential misconduct. Im-
portantly, they are decided by congressional majorities, which entails the risk that 
they may turn to be “[…] regulated more by the comparative strength of parties than 
by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt,” as Alexander Hamilton, one of 
the Founding Fathers of the United States Constitution, wrote more than 200 years 
ago (Hamilton 1788). 
There are three problems with presidential impeachment that have become vis-
ible in the last few years in Latin America. They can be summarised as follows.
First, the fact that presidents are judged by Congress makes it almost inevitable 
that impeachment processes became part of the tug of war of contending political 
forces. Although not entirely unavoidable, an impeachment loses legitimacy as a 
tool of accountability when politics, rather than arresting illegal behaviour, become 
the sole motivation for removing the president. 
Second, an impeachment is a mechanism for removing one person from office; 
namely, the chief executive. If the problem to be solved is linked to that person 
alone, for example due to personal corrupt behaviour, an impeachment may do the 
trick. However, when the issue motivating an impeachment may be a general crisis 
of representation, dismissing the president is only a partial and inconclusive solu-
tion to a much wider and deeper problem, and may actually generate more instabil-
ity down the line (Marsteintredet 2014). 
Third, due to its strict requirements of super-majorities to pass, an impeach-
ment may offer a president too much protection and thus eliminate the deterring 
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effects of impeachment. This may be the case in a strongly polarised polity – such 
as the US was with Donald Trump – or when a president enjoys a strong partisan 
backing that offers him/her an effective political shield (Pérez-Liñán 2007), such as 
in Brazil under the Temer presidency. 
Two recent country cases illustrate the limits attached to the use of this instru-
ment in Latin America. In Peru, two presidents have been impeached in connection 
to factionalism and political instability rather than illegal behaviour. In Brazil, the 
threat of impeachment has been an ineffective tool to stop criminal behaviour from 
the top executive.
The Peruvian Congress in Action – Too Much Impeachment and 
Too Few Solutions
In Peru, the presidential period that started in July 2016 and ended July 2021 had a 
rough start and only became more complicated as time passed. Brazil and Peru have 
been the countries hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, leading the region in 
deaths per capita. Despite solid and relatively stable economic growth since 2000, 
public trust in politicians and political institutions in Peru has been extremely low. 
In 2016, 84 per cent of Peruvians thought that the country was run by a powerful 
group for its own benefit (Latinobarómetro 2016). That same year, a mere 16.5 per 
cent had some or a lot of trust in Congress, and 18.7 per cent showed the same level 
of trust in the government. In 2018, however, the percentage of trust in Congress 
and the government fell to only 8 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively (Latino-
barómetro 2018). If there was a crisis of representation in 2016 when Pedro Pablo 
Kuczynski (also known as PPK) of the centre-right was elected, this crisis had se-
verely worsened only two years later. Self-serving politicians, corruption, and im-
peachments tell part of that story. 
PPK became president after defeating the populist right-wing candidate Keiko 
Fujimori by a tight 50.1–49.9 per cent in the run-off. However, Fujimori and her 
Fuerza Popular party obtained the undisputed leadership of the unicameral legis-
lature of 130 members with a two-thirds majority, while PPK’s party only won 18 
seats. PPK and Fujimori were not far apart ideologically, but the fierce opposition 
led by Fuerza Popular quickly escalated the tensions between the executive and 
Congress and led to a tug of war driven by short-term interests. Just a few months 
after inauguration, PPK’s administration was embedded in corruption allegations 
and the president suffered sharp drops in popularity, even though corruption alle-
gations actually affected the wide political spectrum, including Keiko Fujimori and 
several former presidents. Fuerza Popular took advantage of the weakened presi-
dent and used its institutional strength to obstruct legislation, to censure the gov-
ernment’s ministers, and to bring down the cabinet in September 2017. Eventually, 
institutional stalemate escalated into claims for presidential removal on grounds of 
corruption. 
In December 2017, a congressional investigation produced testimonies linking 
Kuczynski to a bribery scheme with the Brazilian company Odebrecht, and Con-
gress proceeded to accuse him of “permanent moral incapacity.” The impeachment 
attempt failed, however, after PPK signed a deal with Keiko’s estranged brother, 
Kenji Fujimori, leading to the abstention of ten deputies aligned with Kenji. The 
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contents of the deal became evident a few days later, when the president pardoned 
former president Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), [1] provoking public outrage and 
denunciations from human rights organisations. However, the president could only 
briefly benefit from struggles between the Fujimori siblings and the ad-hoc deal 
he had made with Kenji. While the president further weakened in opinion polls, 
Congress investigations produced new revelations (but weak evidence) suggesting 
that the deal that the president had made with Kenji Fujimori was based on bribery. 
These revelations sealed PPK’s fate and led to his resignation in March 2018, a few 
days before a decisive second impeachment would have thrown him out. 
The case against PPK remembers the impeachment against Brazilian President 
Dilma Rousseff in the sense that the evidence was weak, and if anything, evidence 
of corruption was stronger against several of the accusers in the legislature than 
against the president. Removing the president on shaky grounds demonstrated the 
extent to which politicians put their self-interest above that of the political regime. 
While the removal of PPK may have satisfied some of the protestors in the streets, 
it did little to address the crisis of representation that affected the country. In ad-
dition, PPK’s successor, Vice-President Martín Vizcarra, who himself had been ac-
cused of corruption in relation to the construction of an airfield, inherited the same 
difficult political situation – an overwhelming opposing majority in Congress and 
did not receive any mandate to govern.
In fact, Vizcarra also faced continued stalemate and undertook some bold ac-
tions that made him popular but did not save him from impeachment. He took 
advantage of a corruption scandal revealed by an investigative journalism portal, 
this time involving members of the judicial and legislative branches and launched 
far-reaching anti-corruption reforms. Expecting resistance, he appealed directly to 
the public proposing a referendum on the issue. In the short run, his move paid 
off with rising popularity ratings and success at the referendum in which voters 
approved the three questions he had proposed (restructuring the discredited coun-
cil of magistrates, tightening restrictions on political party financing, and ending 
congressional re-election) and decisively rejected the one he opposed (restoring a 
bicameral legislature). In the long run, Vizcarra’s anti-corruption drive would lead 
to a tug of war with Congress. The escalation eventually led to a controversial dis-
solution of Congress, which the Constitutional Tribunal accepted in a four-to-three 
vote. Subsequent congressional elections reduced disruptive Fuerza Popular to only 
15 seats but returned a highly fragmented Congress with new or fringe parties and 
the displacement of the more established ones. Vizcarra maintained his popularity, 
paradoxically in part because he himself did not belong to any political party.
Despite a referendum and a new congressional composition in the midst of the 
pandemic conflicts and stalemate continued. In September 2020, President Vizcar-
ra faced the first (failed) impeachment attempt to be eventually removed by a sec-
ond one with a 105–16 vote on 9 November under accusations of corruption during 
his time as governor in Moquegua. In turn, his successor, Manuel Merino, who was 
the president of the Congress and a main driver for the impeachment, was forced 
to resign after only a few days as president as the impeachment of the still-popular 
Vizcarra created a public outrage and the largest demonstrations in many years. 
In short, in the five years since 2016, Congress made several attempts and in 
fact impeached two presidents, a third president resigned after popular protests, 
and Congress was controversially dissolved and newly elected. If anything, execu-
1 Alberto Fujimori was 
convicted to 25 years in 
prison for responsibility for 
infamous massacres car-
ried out in 1991 and 1992 
by members of the right-
wing death squad Colina.
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tive-legislative conflicts such as these have deepened public distrust, which should 
come as no surprise since an impeachment serves to hold a person, the president, 
to account. Further, these Peruvian impeachments have been weak in arguing for 
executive misconduct, which effectively converts them into votes of no confidence. 
However, a vote of no confidence coming from a distrusted Congress will not be ac-
cepted as a solution to any crisis. 
The 2016–2021 presidential period ended with another close presidential elec-
tion, one that was only officially concluded a month and a half after the day of the 
runoff. Voters were pushed to choose between two extreme candidates: left-wing 
candidate Pedro Castillo and right-wing Keiko Fujimori. Fujimori, who again lost 
by a very narrow margin, claimed that the election was illegitimate and the result 
of ballot rigging. Thus, following Trump’s “fraud playbook” and accompanied by 
the established elites in Lima, Fujimori put democracy in a grave crisis, one that 
resembled her father’s self-coup (“autogolpe”) in 1992. The prospects for President 
Castillo, who assumed power without previous political experience and is extremely 
weak in Congress, are certainly not easy, with the ghosts of recent presidential in-
stability looming on the horizon. 
The Brazilian Congress in Action – Yet No Impeachment 
In his third year in the presidency, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro hardly needs any in-
troduction. A former army captain and long-term backbencher in the Brazilian 
Congress, Bolsonaro was always a questioned figure due to his anti-establishment 
stance, disrespect for democratic institutions, and open defence of past dictator-
ships. Over the past year and a half, his negationist and anti-scientific approach to 
the COVID-19 pandemic has made international headlines. Bolsonaro’s denialism 
not only left the anti-pandemic measures in the hands of other governmental insti-
tutions (namely, Congress and local authorities) but also actively contradicted con-
tainment measures that they pursued, such as social distancing, and even promoted 
unproven remedies, such as hydroxychloroquine. Bolsonaro’s denialist position has 
been so open and his actions so coherent that it is difficult to separate any assess-
ment of the pandemic from the president’s responsibility. The numbers are not in 
his favour: Brazil’s official death toll recently passed 550,000, a sad top to the list of 
pandemic-related scandals that intensified with the passing of time. 
From an early stage, presidential actions and omissions spurred a number of 
impeachment requests against the president. In March 2020, when the pandemic 
burst globally, Bolsonaro was in a power struggle with Congress over control of 
a portion of the executive’s budget and had called for demonstrations across the 
country in his support. (Gatherings prompted by the president later occurred sev-
eral times as well, despite the pandemic getting more serious.) That initial action 
already motivated two dozen impeachment requests that qualified the president’s 
denialism as “crime against public health” and his attacks on democratic institu-
tions among the “crimes of responsibility” foreseen by the law regulating impeach-
ment processes. By July 2021, the number of impeachment requests had reached 
130. Even a super-petition for presidential impeachment had been submitted by an 
extended group of social movements and political parties in the left at the end of 
June, one that contemplated 23 crimes, a collection of presidential faults. 
   6    GIGA FOCUS | LATIN AMERICA | NO. 4 | AUGUST 2021 
It is not uncommon for Brazilian legislators and citizens to submit impeach-
ment requests to reveal the government’s incompetence and wrongdoings (Llanos 
and Pérez-Liñán 2020). Before Bolsonaro, Dilma Rousseff was the president facing 
the highest number (a total of 68). Although most impeachment requests are des-
tined to die in Congress, the alignment of citizen and partisan initiatives in time and 
frequency has been crucial for the outcome of past impeachment processes in Bra-
zil. In the two successful impeachments of presidents Collor de Melo (1990–1992) 
and Rousseff (2014–2016), citizens’ requests had skyrocketed and those of legisla-
tors had followed suit.
Indeed, although there seems to be sufficient ground to initiate impeachment 
proceedings against Bolsonaro, there has been no impeachment yet. Politics mat-
ter here. The president, who came to power sustaining an anti-political sentiment 
as well as promises to end entrenched corruption in politics, initially refused to 
form the government coalitions with congressional parties that had been the rule 
under previous presidents. Instead, Bolsonaro mainly invited technocrats, military 
officers, and radical politicians. However, when things began to get complicated, 
he changed course. In January 2021, with a death toll exceeding 212,000 people 
and a succession of COVID-related scandals, such as the shortage of oxygen and a 
consequent surge of deaths in Manaus, which closely pointed to the president’s and 
his health minister’s errors, the calls for presidential impeachment were revived. 
Bolsonaro understood that he needed to tighten his leverage in Congress and thus 
secured the presidencies of the two chambers and further political support from the 
centrão, a fluid group of opportunistic and power-hungry congressional parties. 
He achieved this through generous handing out of pork funds and ministerial posi-
tions, openly contradicting his electoral promises.
Through the congressional alliance the president has been avoiding impeach-
ment: the president of the Chamber of Deputies – a centrão ally – is a key gate-
keeper in the launching of such a process. However, this informal legislative alli-
ance is unstable and Congress has other institutional instruments that may impact 
on the political chessboard as well. Despite Bolsonaro’s attempts, he was ultimately 
unable to suppress the creation of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) at 
the Federal Senate. Since April of 2021, this initiative of oppositional minorities has 
investigated the mishandling and omissions by the federal executive in the manage-
ment of the pandemic. With televised hearings, the commission’s works have been 
followed like a reality show from Brazilian homes, and they have triggered some un-
expected outcomes for the president. In late June, the inquiry heard explosive alle-
gations of corrupt dealings involving the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines by the 
health ministry, on which Bolsonaro had failed to act despite having been alerted. 
These allegations set a dividing line in the inquiry process because they compro-
mised Bolsonaro’s anti-corruption image, a crucial element of his electoral victory 
in 2018. Public outrage triggered mass anti-Bolsonaro demonstrations, demanding 
impeachment. A Supreme Court justice authorised that the attorney general’s office 
opened an investigation into Bolsonaro’s role in the vaccine corruption scheme.
There is precedent for the suggestion that parliamentary inquiry may have im-
portant consequences. In 1992, the swift and efficient work of such a commission 
compelled people to protest in the streets and eventually legislators to impeach 
President Collor de Mello (Cheibub 2010). Of course, legislators have always an eye 
on the public and their electoral prospects, and Bolsonaro’s support has declined 
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(to 25 per cent in opinion polls) but still not collapsed as in previous successful im-
peachments. All in all, the CPI’s works (as well as a potential trial in Congress) will 
give a sense of accountability to the citizens and some relief to those who suffered 
the government’s misdeeds in the fight against COVID-19. However, the outcome 
is dependent on the evolution of the president’s relation with opportunist allies in 
congress, with which Bolsonaro is still broking deals. As time passes, the likelihood 
that the president will be dismissed diminishes because the stage begins to be set 
for the presidential electoral contest in October 2022. However, with the threat of 
impeachment in the background, electoral politics will remain polarised, and Bra-
zilians will face the two old alternatives: Bolsonaro’s re-election vs. the return of 
ex-President Lula, Bolsonaro’s hated opponent, to power. 
Impeachments and Public Disaffection 
Public disaffection with politics in general has been present in Latin America for a 
while. In 2006, Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez analysed The Crisis 
of Democratic Representation in the Andes, and if anything, the crisis of represen-
tation, including that of political parties, has deepened and broadened beyond the 
Andean cases in recent years. The Journal of Democracy has dedicated its latest is-
sue to the ongoing troubles of democracy in Latin America, labelling the issue: “Lat-
in America erupts.” There are many ways in which this disaffection has expressed 
itself: low turn-out in elections, reduced confidence in established political parties, 
increased political fragmentation, outsider or extreme candidates becoming popu-
lar and winning elections. As the cases of Peru and Brazil presented in these pages 
show, political fragmentation and extreme candidates often come together, as these 
are the only ones who manage to prevail or call attention among the general dis-
credited and the exaggerated number of political offers. Impeachment is often the 
other side of the coin because, against this background, clashes between president 
and congress are not surprising. 
Over the past four decades, 24 Latin American presidents have been dismissed 
from office prematurely. These presidential interruptions or presidential break-
downs (Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010) refer to presidents who have failed to 
complete their constitutionally fixed terms, often due to serious developments in 
the economy, social mobilisations, and political scandals. Legislators were decisive 
in at least ten of these episodes, as indicated in the table below. Presidents Collor 
de Mello, Pérez, Cubas, Lugo, Pérez Molina, Rousseff, Kuczynski, and Vizcarra were 
dismissed through impeachments or resigned when impeachment was becoming 
imminent. Presidents Bucaram, and Gutiérrez, both in Ecuador, were dismissed 
through impeachment-like procedures on grounds of incapacity and abandonment 
of post.
The first impeachments in the 1990s were viewed more positively than those 
today. Fernando Collor de Melo of Brazil, for example, was an outsider and neo-lib-
eral populist, leading his country with a unilateral style in the midst of an economic 
turmoil. He ended up being investigated by Congress, isolated, and dismissed for 
corruption. This institutionalised process of presidential removal in Brazil con-
trasted with other coexisting ways of removing presidents, such as insurrections 
and coups (the second row in the table). The military did not play the role it had 
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in the past in these presidential falls, but coups were a decisive part for the remov-
al of Presidents Mahuad, Zelaya, and Morales. By comparison, impeachment was 
assessed as a mechanism leading to democratic consolidation and accountability 
(Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008).
Impeachments or Impeachment-
like procedures
Collor de Melo (Brazil, 1992); Pérez (Venezuela, 1993); Bu-
caram, (Ecuador, 1997); Cubas (Paraguay, 1999); Gutiérrez 
(Ecuador, 2005); Lugo (Paraguay, 2012); Pérez Molina 
(Guatemala, 2015); Rousseff (Brazil, 2016); Kuczynski 
(Peru, 2018); Vizcarra (Peru, 2020)
Other Presidential interruptions Siles Zuazo (Bolivia, 1985); Alfonsín (Argentina, 1989); 
Serrano (Guatemala, 1993); Balaguer (Dom. Rep., 1996); 
Fujimori (Peru, 2000); Mahuad (Ecuador, 2000)*; De la 
Rúa (Argentina, 2001); Rodríguez Saa (Argentina, 2001); 
Duhalde (Argentina, 2002); Sánchez (Bolivia, 2003); Mesa 
(Bolivia, 2005); Zelaya (Honduras, 2009)*; Morales (Boli-
via, 2019)*; Manuel Merino (2020, Peru)
However, the most recent practice, which became apparent with the 24-hour ex-
press impeachment of President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay in 2012, shows im-
peachments operating in a way that does not seem to correspond to the letter and 
spirit of the constitution (Marsteintredet, Llanos, and Nolte 2013). On one hand, 
when impeachments are solely used with partisan motivation, they lose their legiti-
macy as a tool of accountability. They do not bring political stability either, as care-
takers may be disliked or even rejected by people. The one-week tenure of Merino, 
successor of Vizcarra in 2020 in Peru, is reminiscent of the highly unstable days of 
December 2001 in Argentina, when President Rodríguez Saá, elected by Congress 
to succeed the failing President de la Rúa, had to resign within a week amid popular 
rage. On the other hand, when impeachment is on the table for good reasons, such 
as the incumbent being bedevilled by political scandals and misconduct, it still can 
fail as a reliever of the critical situation if the president controls a substantial share 
of legislative seats that protects him/her from any threat. 
Thus, public disaffection can directly or indirectly lead to impeachments, but 
impeachment processes may feed such disaffection when they are unable to pro-
vide the expected answers. Since 2020, the pandemic has revealed layers of popular 
complaints, some of them in connection with the poor and corrupt performance of 
governments and chief executives, others with long-term state incapacities to pro-
vide basic services. If properly used, impeachments could help to keep the executive 
accountable, although they would be insufficient as an instrument when the whole 
political system is being questioned. 
This year, Latin Americans took the streets again in several countries, such as 
Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, and Guatemala, to express their discontent and even anger 
for various reasons, and often demanding the president’s resignation or impeach-
ment. It is the task of observers and external actors, such as the United States or the 
European Union, to decode the underlying causes of each crisis and address it sup-
porting constructive solutions that emphasise the accountability of political actors 
and institutions as well as responsive public policies.
Table 1 
Presidential Inter-
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